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Abstract
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) market is
skyrocketing towards 100 billion deployed devices and
cybersecurity remains a top priority. This includes
security of ZigBee communication devices that are
widely used in industrial control system applications.
IIoT device security is addressed using ConstellationBased Distinct Native Attribute (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting to augment conventional bit-level security
mechanisms. This work expands upon recent CB-DNA
“discovery” activity by identifying reduced dimensional fingerprints that increase the computational
efficiency and effectiveness of device discrimination
methods. The methods considered include Multiple
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Random Forest
(RndF) classification. RndF deficiencies in classification and post-classification feature selection are
highlighted and addressed using a pre-classification
feature selection method based on a Wilcoxon Rank
Sum (WRS) test. Feature down-selection based on
WRS testing proves to very reliable, with reduced
feature subsets yielding cross-device discrimination
performance consistent with full-dimensional feature
sets, while being more computationally efficient.

1. Introduction
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices are a
specialized subset of IoT devices that support sensing
and control in areas such as water treatment, power
generation and distribution, oil and gas refinement and
distribution, and transportation.
These critical
infrastructure elements are commonly operated through
Industrial Control System (ICS) architectures and it is
estimated that a few billion consumer devices will be
IoT connected by 2020. This is orders-of-magnitude
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lower than some projections which suggest the number
of deployed IIoT devices is rocketing towards reaching
100 billion by 2020 [21].
If reliable, these estimates suggest that some IIoT
deployment barriers have been overcome while others
of remain. This includes technology-based security
factors that contribute to cybersecurity being the topranked challenge in IIoT device deployment [19].
When considered in light of ICS applications, improved
cybersecurity is absolutely essential and protection
remains a national-level priority within both the public
and private sectors [8, 16, 30, 31]. The cybersecurity
challenges are not unique to IIoT devices, and the need
for increasingly secure and reliable communications
remains across other commercial applications and
automation networks supporting medical, home and
building automation, consumer electronics.
Cyberattack mitigation approaches for specifically
targetted communication devices (e.g., IIoT access
points) have primarily focused on bit-level solutions
implemented in upper communication protocol layers.
This includes the network and media access control
layers with much less emphasis placed on physical
(PHY) layer solutions [9, 13, 26]. The underutilized
PHY information [32] can be captured in device
Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) features that provide
human-like discrimination and support a multi-factor
authentication framework that benefits from combined
first-level “something you have” (device address),
second-level “something you know” (network
encryption key), and final “something you are” (PHY
DNA Fingerprint) checks [5, 22]. The goal is to realize
multi-factor authentication benefits and improve device
verification reliability [3, 20] by taking advantage of the
speed and computational efficiency of biometric-based
multi-factor authentication which make it a top-ranked
choice for IoT applications [10].
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1.l. Relationship to Prior Work

2. Background

As a sub-class to the broader Radio Frequency (RF)
fingerprinting domain, RF-DNA Fingerprinting has
been successfully demonstrated in various applications
[14, 18, 23], with specific use for IoT communication
devices demonstrated in [7, 29] and IIoT devices
demonstrated in [15, 27, 28]. Of greater relevance here
is the most recent development and demonstration of
Constellation-Based DNA (CB-DNA) Fingerprinting
[25] and its use in reliably discriminating ZigBee
devices. As with a majority of related RF-DNA works,
device discrimination results in [25] are based on a
Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) classification process.
This work expands upon results in [25] using the
same experimentally collected ZigBee signals, with an
alternate Random Forest (RndF) classifier introduced
given its broad success using RF-DNA fingerprints and
support for post-classification Dimensional Reduction
Analysis (DRA), i.e., identifying the most relevent subset of fingrprint features required for reliable device
discrimination. Resultant RndF performance with CBDNA features was not promising and included 1) a
significant decrease in average cross-class percent
correct classification (%C) when compared with MDA
under identical conditions, and 2) the generation of
unreliable RndF variable importance metrics which
voided their use for DRA assessments.
Degraded performance of the usually-comparableto-MDA RndF classifier and its ineffectiveness for
reliable DRA motivated the introduction and first use
success of pre-classification DRA based on a Wilcoxon
Rank Sum (WRS) test. As developed and successfully
demonstrated here, the WRS-based DRA method
extends the concept of distribution-free assumptions
and utilizes nonparametric statistical techniques for
cross-class feature comparison.

2.1. DNA-Based Device Discrimination

1.2. Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2.1 provides background information in subsections providing details on DNA-Based Device
Discrimination, Experimental ZigBee Signals, CBDNA Fingerprint Generation, and Classifier Models.
Section 3 provides baseline performance results of the
Multiple Discriminant Analysis, Maximum Likelihood
(MDA/ML) and Random Forest (RndF) classifiers.
Section 4 provides details for the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
(WRS) test, its use for feature selection using
Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA), and
comparison of WRS vs. RndF DRA results. Section 5
provides the paper summary and conclusion.

Previous works applied DNA fingerprinting
methods to both wired and wireless signal PHY-based
discrimination [4, 14, 29]. This work focuses on CBDNA Fingerprinting applied to ZigBee devices that are
representative of the 802.15.4 standard class of
communication devices supporting ICS applications.
The specific focus here is on device ID classification as
a means to enhance overall ZigBee network security at
the PHY doorway through which a preponderance of
malicious cyberattacks occur. The concentration here
was on securing Zigbee device operation given that
1) ZigBee devices and related 802.15.4 protocols are
deployed world-wide, and 2) ZigBee operation is a
representative protocol for broader IIoT applications [7,
29]. The degree of required anti-hacking security varies
with ZigBee application criticality and will continue to
increase as the number of connected IoT reaches a few
billion and the number of connected IIoT devices a 100
billion by 2020 [21]. The increased security risks due
to rapid expansion may be offset as the next generation
of IIoT hardware technologies are evolving to include
multi-protocol 802.15.4/Bluetooth/WiFi operation [24].
The development here was motivated by two key
observations of CB-DNA Fingerprinting performance
when applied to ZigBee devices [25]. First, there was a
desire to consider alternate classification techniques
and/or conditional fingerprint features with a goal of
reducing complexity (processing time and storage) to
better support real-time network security using the
multi-factor authentication framework detailed in the
introduction. The first action included a quick-look
assessment using a RndF ensemble classifier given its
previous success in related applications, i.e., it achieved
near-equivalent classification accuracy when compared
to the MDA classifier [14, 18]. The preliminary RndF
CB-DNA findings were not promising and included a
significant decrease in average cross-class percent
correct classification (%C) when compared with MDA
using the same input CB-DNA fingerprints at the same
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR); this anomalous
degradation has not been previously observed in other
MDA and RndF classifier works.
Second, there remains some question regarding the
impact of CB-DNA feature number and feature
“information” content on performance. For the Atmel
ZigBee devices used here, [25] shows that CB-DNA
Fingerprinting provided improved classification
performance relative to RF-DNA Fingerprinting, with
the best overall performance obtained for conditional
versus unconditional CB-DNA features. Of note is the
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disparity between the fingerprint dimensions which
included NUcnd = 36 unconditional and NCnd = 120
conditional features. Thus, it is reasonable to ask if the
better conditional fingerprinting performance is due to
increased feature “information” or simply a matter of
using more features.
Degraded performance of the usually-better-thanMDA RndF classifier and increased classification
performance using an increased number of conditional
features motivated the use of DRA here for CB-DNA
Fingerprinting. The two DRA techniques considered
here included 1) the post-classification RndF method
used for the initial quick-look assessment, with
additional analyses conducted for multiple DRA subsets
based on rank-ordered Gini variable importance indices,
and 2) the first use of a pre-classification WRS test that
yields a comparative metric reflecting feature relevance
and enabling rank-ordered DRA subset feature
selection. The WRS-based DRA method here extends
the concept of distribution-free assumptions and utilizes
nonparametric statistical techniques for cross-class
feature comparison. A head-to-head comparison of
RndF-based and WRS-based DRA feature selection
was completed using MDA/ML classification with a
given number of NDRA selected features.

2.2. Experimental ZigBee Signals
To enable direct comparison, results here are based
on fingerprints generated from the same experimentally
collected ZigBee signals used in [25]. For compleness,
a summary of the experimental collection details are
provided here (see [25] for additional details).
Emissions were collected from the ND = 10 like-model
Atmel devices in a relatively benign (limited
multipath) office environment using an Ettus USRP
X310 radio with the collection bandwidth set to
WColl = 10 MHz and operating at a sample frequency of
fSamp = 10 MSps per I/Q channel. Post-collection
processing included down-conversion and baseband
filtering with a 16th-order Butterworth filter having a
−3.0 dB bandwidth of WBB = 2 MHz.
Following post-collection processing, the average
estimated SNR across all devices and collections was
Prior to CB-DNA fingerprint
SNRC ≈ 40.0 dB.
generation per Section 2.3, additional processing was
applied that included 1) constellation de-rotation
(phase synchronization) on a burst-by-burst basis,
along with 2) SNR-scaling by adding independent, likefiltered (WBB = 2 MHz), power-scaled Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to set the desire analysis
range of SNR ∈ [4.0, 40.0].
Complete details for the Atmel ZigBee devices can
be found in [1, 2], with some details summarized here
in Table 1 for completeness. the Atmel devices include

an AT86RF230 radio transceiver [2] that supports
802.15.4 standard compliant operation in the 2.4 GHz
band. As low cost, low power alternatives the Atmel
devices are widely used in wireless sensor network,
ICS, home and building automation, and many other
consumer electronic applications [1]. The general
ZigBee PHY layer characteristics for these devices are
are shown in Fig. 1. As typical in other wireless
protocols, each transmitted ZigBee burst includes a
preamble response (first 8.3 mSec) that is the primary
region of interest exploited for RF-DNA Fingerprinting.
For the conditional CB-DNA fingerprint generation
process described in Section 2.3 and subsequent results,
statistical features are extracted from all received
communication symbols within each burst.
Table 1. ZigBee physical operating characteristics.
FREQUENCY

2.4 GHz, 868 MHz, 915 MHz

BIT RATE

20-250 Kbits/s

SECURITY

PHY - None
Network - AES 128

LATENCY

≈ 1000 mSec

RANGE

1-75 Meters

MODULATION

O-QPSK

Figure 1. ZigBee protocol layer components.

2.3. CB-DNA Fingerprint Generation
Previous DNA-based works have used any number
of available DNA types, including RF-DNA extracted
from both intentional and unintentional radiated
emissions, Wired Signal DNA (WS-DNA) [14, 15], and
most recently CB-DNA [25].
The CB-DNA
fingerprints used here are identical to those in [25] and
their development is presented here for completeness.
The development is based on an arbitrary complex
sequence {X} having NX elements and the same
NStat = 14 fingerprint features (statistics) are calculated
for both the 1) polar magnitude (Mag) and angle (Ang)
components, and 2) rectangular real (Re) and
imaginary (Im) components of {X}.
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The specific CB-DNA features used here for polar
representation features included variance (σ2), skewness
(γ) and kurtosis (κ) of both the magnitude {Mag[X]}
and angle {Ang[X]} sequences (6 total polar statistics).
Rectangular representation features are calculated using
the [Re{X}:Im{X}]2xNX matrix, with calculated statistics
including three unique co-variance σ2σ2(1:3) values, two
non-trivial co-skewness moments γγ(1:2), and three nontrivial co-kurtosis κκ(1:3) moments. Accounting for all
possible statistics, the Statistical Fingerprint vector for
complex sequence {X} is formed as [25],

W are Gaussian distributed. Consistent with the Fisher
criterion, the matrix W maximizes the ratio of betweenclass spread (projected class means) to within-class
spread (projected class variance). For discrimination of
NCls classes using input fingerprint vectors have NF
features, the projection matrix W is of dimension
NF x (NCls-1) and is used to project (1xNF)-dimensional
input fingerprints (F) into the (NCls-1)-dimensional class
estimation space.
Given a trained MDA model that includes matrix
W, input fingerprint scale factors, projected class
training means, and projected class training variances, a
1 vs. NCls called-class estimate (correct or incorrect) for
an “unknown” input testing fingerprint FTst is made by
first calculating,

(1)

(4)

where
denotes concatenation.
For conditional
in (1) are calculated for
CB-DNA Fingerprinting the
NSG selected conditional subgroups of the received
signal constellation. The n =1, 2, … NSG subgroup
elements for the mth symbol in the M-ary signaling
constellation are used to form the mth Conditional
according to,
CB-DNA Fingerprint Vector

where
is the projection of FTst in the Fisher space.
is made based on the
The classification estimate for
conditional probability relationship given by,
(5)

(
2)

which are then concatenated to form the Composite
Conditional CB-DNA Fingerprint Vector as,

where j = 1, 2, …, NCls and i≠j. Assuming P(ci) = 1/NCls
for all classes and equal error costs, the relationship in
(2) becomes a Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimate that
is obtained by maximizing the conditional
with the class yielding highest probability being the
(this is now referred to as an
called-class for
MDA/ML classification process).

(3)

where
is the total number of
conditional CB-DNA features.
In general, both
unconditional and conditional CB-DNA fingerprint
features can be generated using all or a subset of noted
statistics, calculated for all or a subset of available
projected groups. Results here are based solely on
conditional fingerprints given their demonstrated
superiority over unconditional fingerprints using the
selected ZigBee signals [25]. The full-dimensional
conditional fingerprints include NFD = 270 features and
are equally divided into NTRN = 550 training and
NTST = 550 testing observations per ZigBee device.

2.4. Classifier Models
2.4.1. Multiple Discriminant Analysis/Maximum
Likelihood (MDA/ML). MDA is a computationally
efficient process that has provided reliable device ID
discrimination in prior DNA-based works [4, 7, 14, 29].
It is a multi-class extension of Fisher’s Linear
Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and performs best when
the input fingerprint features and their corresponding
projections via the eigenvector-based projection matrix

2.4.2. Random Forest (RndF). The RndF classifier
implemented here was based on [6, 14, 17, 18] and
includes an ensemble of single decision tree classifiers
used to produce a single classification decision.
Relative to MDA/ML, RndF benefits include 1) it not
being constrained to specific input data distributions
and, 2) it provides a measure of feature relevance called
variable importance that is available after training [6].
The two fundamental parameters impacting RndF
performance include 1) the number of decision trees
(classifiers), and 2) the number of predictors (features)
sampled at each node. Classifier model development
begins by using all observations (i.e., fingerprints
containing all features) at a single node. The initial
node is then is split into two child nodes, with the split
based on a random predictor selection and threshold
values for features of each observation at that node.
Not all features are considered at each node and
predictor selection is done with replacement, i.e., a
given feature may be used as a splitting criterion at
multiple nodes. The DNA features selected as the
splitting criterion include those producing the largest
change in Gini-Index (GI) from a parent node to its
children nodes [14]. The index reflects the probability
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3. Results: MDA/ML vs. RndF
RndF was introduced to enable 1) one-to-one
comparison with prior MDA/ML performance in [25],
and 2) assessment of post-classification RndF-based
DRA as used successfully in prior work [14]. Results
in Fig. 2 shows classification %C vs. SNR performance
for MDA/ML and RndF classifiers under selected
fingerprinting conditions. The two highest %C curves
are MDA/ML classifier performance using NCond = 270
conditional and NUcnd = 36 unconditional CB-DNA
fingerprint features as in [25]. These are provided for
reference with the highest conditional MDA/ML curve
being the baseline for RndF comparisons.
The MDA/ML results in Fig. 2 affirm intuition that
adding more features improves accuracy, but a question
remains as to whether or not there is a smaller subset of
conditional features, closer in number to the
unconditional feature set, that could achieve similar
accuracy. Given that MDA/ML provides no insight
into feature relevance on the final classification
decision, post-classification RndF DRA was initially
considered. The first DRA step included running the
RndF classifier with the full-dimensional NFD = 270
conditional CB-DNA fingerprints. These results are
provided in Fig. 2 and reflect considerably poorer
performance than MDA/ML across all SNR. RndF
does achieve the arbitrary benchmark of %C = 90% at
SNR = 28 dB but this is approximately %C∆ ≈ 10%
poorer than MDA/ML.
As previously stated, the level of degraded RndF
%C performance relative to MDA/ML in Fig. 2 is
inconsistent with previous works. However, this did
not preclude consideration of RndF-based DRA using
the rank-ordered Gini indices returned from the RndF
classifier. These are shown plotted in Fig. 3 for the
SNR = 28 dB model that achieved the arbitrary
%C = 90% benchmark. The sorted Gini indices in
Fig. 3a are used for DRA feature selection and the

MDA/ML vs. RndF Classification
100

80

Ave Pct Correct (%C)

that a single observation at a given node is from a
particular class with GI = 0 occurring when a node
contains only one observation from every class. The
final grown forest contains final leaf nodes, each of
which represents an individual classification decision
for a given input fingerprint.
The resultant classifier can be used for postclassification RndF-based DRA feature selection by
considering the mean decrease in GI, denoted as λGI(k)
[14, 18] and computed for the kth feature by averaging
the change in GI each time the kth feature is used at a
splitting decision. The resulting vector of λGI(k) for
k = 1, 2, …, NF is sorted and provides the mechanism
feature ranking to form RndF-selected DRA subsets.

60

MDA/ML Cond (270) [Ron19]

40

MDA/ML UnCond (36) [Ron19]
RndF Cond (270)
RndF Cond: Hgh-Ranked (52)
RndF Cond: Mid-Ranked (52)

20

RndF Cond: Low-Ranked (52)
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Figure 2. MDA/ML vs. RndF average classification
performance using the indicated features.
unsorted indices in Fig. 3b showing how the relevant
features are distributed within the input fingerprints.
The sorted Gini indices in Fig. 3a reflect the typical
highest-to-lowest ascending trend observed with
previous signals but the ascension rate is slower with
the the least relevant features asymptotically approach
near-zero versus zero values; this indicates that nearly
all of the conditional CB-DNA features have some
relevancy as a classification predictor. The RndF Gini
relevancy is investigated by considering three DRA sets
comprised of the NDRA = 52 highest, middle, and lowest
ranked features (the highlighted regions in Fig. 3a).
The corresponding classification results for highest
(▲), middle (▼), and lowest (►) ranked DRA subsets
are shown overlaid in Fig. 2. By comparing all RndF
conditional results in Fig. 2, there is minimal impact on
RndF classification regardless of the relevancy
indicated by Gini indices in Fig. 3. This affirms that
selection of features is partly causal to degraded
performance, and motivates consideration of an
alternate DRA feature selection method that better
exploits feature differences. This is addressed using a
pre-classification method based on the WRS test.

4. Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) Test
4.1. WRS Process Development
There are many nonparametric statistical tests from
which to choose, and all of them focus on different
aspects of the underlying data distribution. The WRS
test is considered to examine the feasibility of using
nonparametric statistical analysis as a DRA method
where the focus is on the difference in medians of the
underlying distributions.
The only assumptions required to employ the WRS
test is that the data (input fingerprint features) being
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RndF Sorted Gini, SNR = 28dB
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(a) Sorted Gini indices showing the relationship of the
highest, middle, and lowest ranked NDRA = 52 features.
RndF UnSorted Gini, SNR = 28dB
1

Norm Gini
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(b) Unsorted Gini indices showing the distribution of
relevant features witin the input fingerprints.

Figure 3. RndF Gini indices for the NFD = 270
conditional fingerprint features that yielded
C% ≈ 90% results at SNR = 28 dB in Fig. 2.
compared are from a continuous distribution and that
they are independent (both within their respective
population and are mutually independent). Since the
comparison for a given fingerprint feature is actually a
cross-device comparison, the features are indeed
independent given that CB-DNA fingerprints are
extracted one-for-one from independently collected
device emissions. Moreover, the features are samples
from a continuous time domain signal and are therefore
from an underlying continuous distribution.
Having satisfied the assumptions, the WRS test
considers whether or not the two different classes
represented in the feature are from distributions with
equal medians [11]. For the purpose of cross-class
discrimination and DRA, the goal is to find
comparisons that fail the WRS test. That is, a failure of
the WRS test indicates that, for a given feature and
cross-class comparison, regardless of the exact nature
of the two underlying distributions, they have different

medians. This difference, should it be significant
enough, may be exploitable by the MDA/ML or RndF
classification processes.
Of note for this class of tests, nonparametric
statistical methods in general do not have the same
strict assumptions as their equivalent parametric tests.
However, to produce a DRA method that is broadly
applicable to various DNA Fingerprinting methods, the
concept of asymptotic relative efficiency of the WRS
test is considered. As with many nonparametric
statistical tests, the asymptotic relative efficiency of the
WRS test suggests that even if the underlying
distribution is actually normal, there is a minimal loss
of test efficiency (i.e., data required to produce a similar
result) and strong agreement between the test outcomes
whether using equivalent parametric or nonparametric
tests. Therefore, a nonparametric method for DRA can
be used in any application if the test’s assumptions are
met, and regardless of whether or not the equivalent
parametric assumptions are met.
The pre-classification DRA methodology here
utilizes the WRS metrics of input CB-DNA fingerprints
to identify the most relevant features for DRA selection.
Given that %C ≈ 90% was achieved at SNR = 28 dB for
both the MDA/ML and RndF classifiers in Fig. 2, this is
the SNR selected for WRS development and analysis.
The WRS test is accomplished for each cross-class
comparison and the output is either 1) a value of 1
indicating the test failed to reject the null hypothesis
and concluding the distribution medians are not similar,
or 2) a value of 0 indicating the null hypothesis test
passed and the medians are similar. The results are
aggregated into an NCls x NCls upper triangular matrix,
where the row/column combination represents the
classes being compared. This processes is repeated for
each NF feature and yields an NCls x NCls x NF matrix. A
simple metric for feature relevance arises by summing
the NCls x NCls elements (excluding the diagonal
elements) which yields NF scalars that are denoted by
HF and represent the sum of WRS hypothesis test
failures. For example, the maximum value of this
summation for a given feature for NCls = 10 classes is 45
if there is a 1 in all of the upper triangular elements.
The final test results are combined to form the vector
.

(5)

Similar to RndF-based DRA in Section 2.4.2, it was
desirable to develop a WRS-based DRA method using a
relevance metric that discriminates between seemingly
similar features. The hypothesis test presented here
outputs a p-value for the WRS test, which may be
thought of as how strongly to weigh the decision
produced by the test. Since the p-value is isolated to the
specific test under which it was conducted, the method
of summing the values as previously discussed is
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Sorted WRS, SNR = 28 dB
1.2
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Ranked

Ranked

Ranked
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0.2

0
1

.

Highest
1

Norm WRS

inappropriate. The use of entropy as a RndF Gini-Index
alternative [12] motivated consideration of an entropybased approach here. However, the entropy of an
NCls x NCls x NF matrix of p-values provides a scalar
representation which can be averaged across the feature
to determine the relative weight of the decision criteria
at a given feature. Since a low value of entropy is
desired, each average value is subtracted from the
maximum average value to compute the final average
entropy matrix (E) of p-values, given by

28

55

82

(6)

To produce a feature relevance metric to score all
NF features, the matrix consisting of the product of the
two metrics at the same feature is proposed as,
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(a) Sorted metrics showing the relationship between the
highest, middle, and lowest ranked NDRA = 52 features.
UnSorted WRS, SNR = 28 dB

,

(7)

1

Norm WRS

0.8

where each element in
is the relevance of the feature
corresponding to that element according to this entropybased weighted WRS metric.

4.2. Results: WRS-Based DRA
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(b) UnSorted metrics showing the distribution of relevant
features across the input fingerprints.

Figure 4. Normalized weighted WRS feature ranking
metric for full-dimensional NFD = 270 conditional CBDNA fingerprints at SNR = 28 dB.
MDA/ML Classification: WRS-Selected DRA Features
100

80
Full-Dim (270)

Ave Pct Correct (%C)

The normalized weighted WRS metric plots in
Fig. 4 for SNR = 28 dB CB-DNA fingerprints include
the sorted Fig. 4a metrics used for DRA feature subset
selection and unsorted Fig. 4b metrics presented to
enable visualization of how relevant features are
distributed within the fingerprints. Presentation of
assessment results for weighted WRS metric
exploitability at SNR = 28 dB is arbitrary and a matter
of convenience to enable direct comparison with
previously presented RndF results. The Fig. 4 results
provide intuition that among the full-dimensional
NFD = 270 conditional CB-DNA feature set there exists
more relevant proper subsets to be considered for
classification DRA assessment.
As with Section 3 RndF assessments, weighted
WRS metric relevancy was investigated by considering
three DRA sets comprised of the NDRA = 52 highest,
middle, and lowest ranked features highlighted in
Fig. 4a. The corresponding classification performance
for highest (▲), middle (▼), and lowest (►) ranked
WRS subsets are shown overlaid in Fig. 5 along with
the NFD = 270 full-dimensional performance. The DRA
%C trends in Fig. 5 indicate that 1) benefit is realized
relative to the less effective RndF-selected DRA
performance in Fig. 2, 2) performance is consistent with
the highest-to-middle-to-lowest relevancy indicated in
Fig. 4b, and 3) pre-classification DRA via rank-ordered
weighted WRS metrics is a viable alternative.
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Figure 5. MDA/ML classification for full-dimensional
NFD = 270 CB-DNA features and WRS-selected DRA
subsets containing NDRA = 52 highest, middle, and
lowest ranked features in Fig. 4a.
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4.3. Results: WRS vs. RndF DRA
For a final comparison, the RndF Gini relevance
ranking in Fig. 3a was revisited and MDA/ML
classification results generated for RndF-selected
NDRA = 165, NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52 subsets. These
results are presented in Fig. 7 along with the equivalent
WRS-selected DRA results from Fig. 6. Considering
the performance “gain” (G∆dB) of DRA selection
methods at %C = 90%, calculated as the difference in
required SNR for two DRA subsets to achieve the same
%C = 90%, the WRS-selected DRA subsets provide
4.0 < G∆dB < 8.0 dB over the RndF-selected subsets.

5. Summary and Conclusions

MDA/ML Classification: WRS-Selected DRA Features
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80

60
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Figure 6. MDA/ML classification performance for
the full-dimensional NFD = 270 CB-DNA feature set
and WRS-selected DRA subsets thereof containing
NDRA = 165, NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52, features
selected using the sorted ranking in Fig. 4a.

MDA/ML Classification: DRA Selection Comparison
100

80

Ave Pct Correct (%C)

Returning to one of the main goals of reducing the
number of required features to achieve a given
performance, while minimizing required computation
complexity (time, memory, etc.), Fig. 4a weighted
WRS rank-ordering was used to analyze MDA/ML
classification performance for various DRA subsets.
Classification results for the top-ranked NDRA = 165,
NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52 subsets are provided in
Fig. 6 and represent an approximate 39%, 53% and
80% fingerprint dimensional reduction, respectively.
Of note in Fig. 6 results is that all WRS-selected DRA
subsets achieve the arbitrary %C = 90% benchmark for
SNR ≤ 24 dB, with the NDRA = 165 (39% reduced)
subset achieving statistical equivalent performance to
the full-dimensional set.

60

WRS-Selected (165)

40

WRS-Selected (126)
WRS-Selected (52)
RndF-Selected (165)
RndF-Selected (126)

20

RndF-Selected (52)

Estimates suggest that the number of deployed IIoT
devices could reach 100 billion connected devices by
2020 [21] and technology-based hardware security
concerns contribute to making cybersecurity the topranked IIoT challenge [19]. Demonstrations here
address physical layer based security enhancement
using Constellation Based Distinct Native Attribute
(CB-DNA) Fingerprinting to reliably discriminate
Atmel ZigBee devices that are representative of the
802.15.4 standard class of devices commonly used in
IIoT applications. Results here expand upon work in
[25] and demonstrate a pre-classification method that
provides reliable fingerprint dimensional reduction and
identifies feature subsets that 1) achieve discrimination
performance of full-dimensional fingerprint sets, while
2) supporting a more efficient implementation of multifactor device authentication.
Improvements here include the introduction of preclassification Dimensional Reduction Analysis (DRA)
based on a Wilcoxon Rank Sum (WRS) test. As
developed and demonstrated herein, the WRS-based
DRA feature selection process effectively identified a
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Figure 7. MDA/ML classification performance
showing a comparison of pre-classification WRSselected features used for Fig. 6 results and
corresponding post-classification RndF-selected DRA
subsets based on Fig. 3a containing NDRA = 165,
NDRA = 126, and NDRA = 52 features selected using
the sorted RndF Gini ranking in Fig. 4a.
reduced dimensional feature subset containing 157 of
the 270 full-dimensional features (an approximate 42%
reduction) that 1) produced statistically equivalent
classification performance as the full-dimensional set
while inherently reducing the computational complexity
(processing time, memory, etc.) required for real-time
security augmentation, and 2) yielded an SNR “gain”
(reduction in required SNR to achieve a given average
percent correct %C classification performance) of
4.0 < G∆dB < 8.0 dB at %C = 90% when compared with
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equal dimension DRA subsets selected using a postclassification variable importance metric produced by
the Random Forest (RndF) classifier.
The effectiveness of WRS-based DRA for CB-DNA
features, and corresponding abysmal performance of the
previously effective RndF-based DRA process used for
RF-DNA features, is attributed to inherent CB-DNA
feature “information” that appears to possess more
exploitable characteristics than those occurring in
corresponding RF-DNA features of the same collected
bursts. This phenomena remains an area of interest for
future studies, including the investigation of other preclassification statistical tests and their potential benefit
for DRA feature selection. Collectively considering all
results, DNA-based fingerprint discrimination continues
to be relevant as it pertains to exploitable physical layer
information contained in IIoT communications.
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